Andrei Shleifer is the 1999 recipient of the John Bates Clark Medal, an award presented by the American Economic Association to an outstanding economist under the age of 40. The Clark medal citation singles out his contributions to three¯elds, corporate¯nance (corporate governance, law and¯nance), the economics of¯nancial markets (deviations from e±cient markets), and the economics of transition. One could add a fourth area, an early but then spurned love, macroeconomics (the role of increasing returns in cycles and growth).
In each area that Andrei has touched, his contributions have shaped the basic paradigm and have triggered considerable follow-up research. Andrei focuses on the big issues of economics. A recurring theme of his research is the respective role of markets, institutions, and governments. In his work, markets do not work perfectly and institutions are of the essence. But one should not trust governments to always do the right thing, be it in the design of institutions or in direct interventions. Governments are not perfect either, and sometimes, they can be quite bad indeed.
In the hands of others, such themes could lead to ideological blabber or to banal generalities. In Andrei's hands, they don't. In each case, Andrei focuses on a speci¯c market, a speci¯c institution, a speci¯c mechanism. He writes down a simple model, very much in the old Chicago tradition, and uses it as a guide to the empirical evidence. He looks at the available evidence, often, as in his work on law and¯nance, assembling that evidence for thē rst time. The general lessons come from the accumulation of papers and evidence. This is why his work is so convincing and in°uential, and likely to endure.
This article summarizes Andrei's contributions. The next four sections describe his contributions to macroeconomics, to¯nancial markets, to corporate¯nance, and to transition. The books and papers by Andrei referenced in this article are listed in chronological order in Table 1 , and referred to by number in the text. Other references are by author and date. Firms that must decide when to implement an innovation might prefer to do it in booms, when the size of the market and monopoly pro¯ts are larger, which will lead to bunching of implementations and to output booms and busts.
The article was important in many ways. It showed that small technological shocks could have large e®ects on output. It showed one way in which imperfect competition could have a major impact on the nature of°uctua-tions. Even today, it may be one of the most convincing real business cycle models around, showing how a smooth stream of inventions can generate large short run°uctuations in output. Indeed, the model may well provide one of the clues for the mechanism behind the current Internet-driven U.S.
expansion.
As Andrei moved from Cambridge to Princeton and then to Chicago after his Ph.D., he started exploring a related but distinct theme, the role of increasing returns in both growth and°uctuations. In what turned out to be the beginning of a long collaboration, he joined e®orts with Kevin Murphy In \Industrialization and the Big Push" [7] , Andrei, Kevin, and Rob took up an old idea in development economics, the \Big Push" argument¯rst put forward by Rosenstein-Rodan in 1943. The Rosenstein-Rodan argument was based on increasing returns to scale. If, in a poor economy, any one¯rm shifted to an increasing returns technology, the market might be too small to allow this¯rm to make pro¯ts. But if many¯rms shifted at the same time|in a \big push"|the market might then be large enough to allow each of them to be pro¯table. The contribution of the paper was to formalize the argument and clarify the conditions under which it held. The¯rst conclusion was quite striking: In the absence of other distortions, the big push argument did not hold. If adopting an increasing returns technology was unpro¯table for one¯rm, this implied that a¯rst¯rm adopting that technology would decrease, rather than increase, the size of the market for other¯rms. If it was unpro¯table for one¯rm in isolation, it remained unpro¯table for all rms to do it simultaneously. The paper then showed how the argument could be rescued, what other plausible distortions might introduce a wedge between the e®ects on pro¯t and the e®ects on market size, leading to the possibility of multiple equilibria and scope for a big push.
In \Income Distribution, Market Size and Industrialization" [6] , Andrei, Kevin, and Rob pursued a related theme|again an old and somewhat fuzzy theme in development economics|that productivity growth in agriculture might lead to an increase in the size of the market for manufactured goods, making it pro¯table for manufacturing¯rms to shift to an increasing returns technology. In that article, they emphasized the importance of income distribution for growth. Too much equality, or too much inequality, both led In \Building Blocks of Market Clearing Business Cycle Models" [8] , Andrei, Kevin, and Rob turned to the scope for increasing returns to generate°uctuations. They focused on external increasing returns (external to each¯rm, but internal to the industry), and showed that, if the demand for goods was su±ciently intertemporally elastic (as may be the case for durables such as cars, where a small expected decrease in the price may lead people to delay their purchase), such increasing returns could lead to cycles, with production being bunched over time, and periods of high and low production and productivity. Their model was useful in clarifying what might be needed to generate such°uctuations. But it was not convincing.
The evidence for substantial external increasing returns remains weak, at least at business cycle frequencies. Ten years later, it is fair to say that we (the macroeconomists) are still unclear about the role of increasing returns in short-run°uctuations.
After writing that paper, Andrei concluded that macroeconomics was much too hard, and he concentrated on¯nance. He may have been wiser than those of us who stayed in the¯eld. But his work remains in°uential, both in macroeconomics and in development.
Ine±cient Financial Markets
Most of Andrei's work on¯nancial markets is best described as a challenge to the e±cient markets hypothesis|the proposition that the prices of¯nancial assets are always equal to the appropriately discounted expected value of payments associated with the asset. were investors whose demand was unrelated to expected returns, and their demand was simply taken to be white noise. Other investors were assumed to be risk averse expected utility maximizers, with rational expectations.
By assumption, these investors had¯nite horizons, which meant that if the price of the asset was lower than its fundamental value, investors could not buy it and hold it forever (a riskless strategy), but had to resell at some point in the future, bearing the risk that the price might diverge even further from fundamentals at that point. This implied that investors took only limited positions, and arbitrage was therefore limited. Under these assumptions, the price will typically di®er from its fundamental value. Asset prices will also exhibit mean reversion: A high price relative to the fundamental value would be followed on average by a decline in the price in the future, a low price by an increase in the price.
Andrei showed how this approach could shed light on one of the most puzzling facts in¯nance, the \closed-end fund puzzle." Closed-end funds are mutual funds that hold other publicly traded securities and issue a given number of shares which then trade on the stock market. One might have thought that the values of these shares would always re°ect the value of the underlying securities, but they do not. Closed-end funds typically (but not always) sell at a discount, although the discount varies a lot over time.
In \Investor Sentiment and the Closed-end Fund Puzzle" [11] , written with Charles Lee and Richard Thaler, Andrei argued that tax, agency, and liqShleifer 7 uidity considerations could not explain these facts, and that the most likely explanation was indeed a combination of noise trading and limited arbitrage.
More speci¯cally, he argued, closed-end funds were owned and traded primarily by individual investors, more so than the companies whose securities the funds held, and thus their prices were more likely to be a®ected by noise trading. Arbitrage by other investors was neither costless nor riskless. A takeover of a fund, followed by a sell-o® of the assets, was typically di±cult.
In short, arbitrage was not su±cient to eliminate the e®ects of noise trading.
In that light, varying discounts were not a puzzle, and the average positive discount re°ected the fact that noise trading made closed-end funds more risky than its underlying securities.
The article then provided a clever test of the theory. Under the assumption that noise trading was primarily due to shifts in sentiment among individual investors, the theory suggested that, in periods when discounts among closed-end mutual funds widened, stocks held primarily by individual investors would perform poorly. Given the fact that small capitalization stocks are more heavily held by individual inverstors, Andrei ranked stocks by capitalization size, and showed that, indeed, discounts widened when small capitalization stocks did poorly.
In another empirical paper, \Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk" [16] , Andrei, together with Josef Lakonishok and Rob Vishny, documented the presence and the nature of mean reversion. They showed that stocks which were \undervalued"|that is, had low ratios of market prices to some proxy for fundamentals like book value or earnings|consistently overperformed the market thereafter. They created ten di®erent portfolios of stocks for each year in the sample, based on, say, ratios of market-to-book value. Looking at the performance of these portfolios over the following¯ve years, they found that the rate of return on stocks in the lowest decile in terms of market-to-book value had on average exceeded the rate of return on stocks in the highest decile by close to 10 percentage points a year. This Shleifer 8 paper triggered an intense debate about whether these results could be explained by di®erences in risk. Because one can never be sure one is using the right measure of risk, this debate is unlikely to ever be settled. But in that paper as in later ones, Andrei has shown that the conclusion is robust to the introduction of existing measures of risk.
In his Clarendon Lectures [B3], Andrei reviews the list of anomalies which has been documented by him and by others, and argues that most can be put into two categories. The¯rst category is \underreaction" to news at high frequency, a phenomenon also called \momentum" in the literature.
It appears that bond and stock prices do not respond to publicly announced news instantaneously, but rather take a few weeks or even a few months to adjust; the implication is that initial increases in prices are on average followed by further predictable increases in prices. The second category is \overreaction" to sequences of news of the same sign: A sequence of positive news about a company tends to lead to overvaluation. As this overvaluation slowly disappears, realized returns tend to be low. In other words, \glamour stocks" do poorly, and \value stocks" do well. While the initial noise trader model showed the nature of the ingredients needed to generate deviations from the e±cient markets hypothesis, it was too crude to give an explanation for this full set of anomalies. This led Andrei to develop two extensions of the original model.
In \Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation" [9] , with Brad De Long, Lawrence Summers, and Robert Waldman, Andrei extended the initial model to allow noise traders to respond to past returns, thus creating a positive feedback from past returns to current demand. This extension could indeed explain the positive correlation of stock prices at short horizons|as noise traders come to the market, increasing demand and prices|and negative correlation of stock prices at long horizons|as prices return to fundamentals. But, in a way, it did this too easily: Any behavior of prices can be obtained with the appropriate [14], written with Rob Vishny. In that paper, Andrei and Rob argued that the value of the collateral of a¯rm would vary with market conditions. In bad times,¯rms with the highest value use for assets might be¯nancially constrained, and¯rms with a lower value use but more cash may be the only buyers, leading the collateral assets to sell at a large discount. This paper can be seen as a precursor to the in°uential \credit cycle" model developed later by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . Indeed, the discussion of cyclical illiquidity (large discounts in bad times),¯re sales, and deep pocket investors, anticipates many of the themes developed in current research.
Corporate Governance
Andrei's general approach to this subject is nicely summarized in \A Survey of Corporate Governance" [20] , with Rob Vishny. The survey is organized Takeovers are often thought of as one of the main mechanisms through which agency problems can be alleviated: Managers who misbehave know the¯rm might then be taken over and that they might be¯red. However, Grossman and Hart (1980) suggested that this mechanism might not work. If existing shareholders concluded that an outsider could indeed take measures to increase the value of the¯rm, they would insist on selling to that outsider only at a price re°ecting this increase in value. But, in so doing, they would eliminate all¯nancial incentives for the outsider to take over. In \Large In a controversial article, \Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers", [4] , written with Lawrence Summers, Andrei argued that takeovers might succeed not because they led to more e±cient production, but because new management might not respect the implicit contracts between the existing management and various stakeholders. Looking at the takeover of TWA by Carl Icahn, he showed that the takeover premium was roughly equal to the present value of wage losses by the three TWA unions: pilots,°ight attendants, and machinists. This paper made two important points. First, the increase in the value of the¯rm during a takeover might not re°ect increases in productivity, but rather redistribution of rents. Second, takeovers had to be understood in the context of the complex set of implicit contracts which characterizes modern¯rms. This paper has in°uenced the ongoing debate on \stakeholders" and their proper role in corporate governance.
Perhaps one of the most striking aspects of corporate governance is how Examining that data set, he showed that legal rules di®er enormously across countries. Speci¯cally, the commercial laws of most countries belong to one of four major legal families: common law, French, German, and Scandinavian civil law. Countries from the common law family protect investors|whether shareholders or creditors|the most, and countries from the French civil law family protect them the least (and thus are most favorable to the insiders). As a general rule, countries from the French family (although not France itself, a point on which I feel I must insist) have the weakest enforcement of legal rules. Andrei argued that these differences in institutions|which in many countries have been exogenously imposed by colonial powers or occupying armies and thus can be taken as largely exogenous|could go a long way in explaining di®erences in¯nancial structure across countries. Indeed, because the legal origin of laws is predetermined decades, if not centuries, before corporate decisions are made, it has proven to be a very useful instrument in cross-country work usinḡ nancial variables, as in Rajan and Zingales (1998).
\Law and Finance" also took a¯rst step in looking at the relation be- Second, ownership concentration is negatively related both to the quality of shareholders' protection embodied in the legal rules and to the quality of enforcement of these rules. Apparently, large shareholders appear when investor protection is weak and concentrated ownership is necessary to secure a larger share of the¯rm's pro¯t. The approach Andrei followed is presented in \Privatizing Russia" [B1], written with Boycko and Vishny. Its conceptual starting point is the distinction between \control rights" and \cash°ow rights" introduced by Grossman and Hart (1986). Under central planning, control rights|that is, the right to make decisions in the¯rms|had been mostly in the hands of ministries, and to a lesser extent, of company managers. Because neither ministries nor managers had cash°ow rights (these belonged to the \Russian public"), their incentives were wrong, and¯rms were highly ine±cient. By decentralizing decisions, the Gorbachev reforms of the 1980s actually made things worse. They led to the emergence of a large number of new stakeholders, each with some control rights: Local governments were now more powerful, and so were company managers and workers. Because these additional stakeholders still did not have cash°ow rights, the outcome was worse, not better.
The starting point of any privatization program, Andrei argues, was to recognize the reality of these stakeholders, including ministries, local governments, managers, and workers. Many of the privatization projects in Central Europe in the early 1990s had ignored this reality, and assumed that¯rms belonged to the state, with the state being free to dispose of them at will. As a result, most privatizations were bogged down, with the existing stakeholders making sure that unless they themselves were compensated, these projects would never be implemented. The challenge was then to design privatization so it would not be blocked by these stakeholders but still achieve an e±cient structure of corporate governance.
Following these general principles, the¯rst step of Russian privatization was to implement \corporatization;" that is, to transform¯rms into joint stock companies, with all the shares still held by the state. The purpose was to reduce the power of ministries, based on the political assessment that they had become weak enough that their stake could simply be eliminated. The second step was to put local governments in charge of small-scale privatization, and allow them to keep the proceeds. The motivation was to give them cash°ow rights in these¯rms in exchange for giving up control rights in the larger¯rms. The third step was to give enough to workers and managers that they were willing to go along with privatization. Various options were o®ered; the most popular turned out to be one which allowed insiders to acquire more than half of the shares in the¯rms. The fourth step was to give enough to the public that privatization would have popular support. This was the \voucher privatization" part of the plan. Each citizen was given vouchers that could be sold for cash, used to bid for shares, or turned over to private investment funds. The rules governing auctions were kept simple enough that auctions could be implemented quickly. By June 1994, mass privatization was completed. By then, two-thirds of Russian industry was privately held.
\Privatizing Russia" is a beautiful piece of applied (in both senses of the word) economics, and an example of how to think about politically feasible reform. But is Russian privatization a success?
There is no question that things did not turn out as well as the privatizers had hoped. Some of the stakeholders they thought they had bought o® proved more resilient than anticipated. Local governments did disappear from the scene. Rather than being sold to strong outside investors, Depoliticization has also been limited; indeed, in some cases, privatization has increased the political power of managers, making it easier for them to extract rents from the state. In short, Russian privatization is an illustration of the conclusions from Andrei's work on corporate governance around the world: Privatization is essential but it is not enough. What is also needed is good corporate governance, and this is much more di±cult to achieve.
The relevant question however is whether, as some have suggested, there was, then and there, a better way. Given the political constraints, the only feasible alternative was probably no privatization|a holding pattern for rms until other institutions were built, and better corporate governance could be established. It is far from obvious that the outcome would have In \The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform"
[13], with Kevin Murphy and Rob Vishny, Andrei focused on another reason why the Gorbachev reforms had made matters worse rather than better. To the extent that suppliers were now freer to sell to private¯rms at market prices, but could only sell to state¯rms at state prices, state¯rms were more likely to su®er from shortages than before. The result could well be an overall reduction in output, rather than an increase. In contrast, the central government in China kept tighter control of suppliers and could more easily impose minimum delivery quotas on suppliers to state¯rms, thus avoiding the overall decrease in output. In the past few years, Andrei has extended his focus beyond the issues of transition to look at the role of the government more generally.
In \The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons" [22] , Andrei and Rob Vishny have joined forces with Oliver Hart, applying the incomplete contracting approach developed earlier by Hart to think about the pros and cons of government ownership. They think of goods as having two main dimensions, cost and quality. In general, they argue, private providers are likely to have stronger incentives to lower cost and improve quality than government employees. But to the extent that quality is hard to measure, either by the government or by the consumers of the good, and to the extent that reductions in quality can yield reductions in cost, private providers are also more likely to provide too low a quality level.
Using this framework, they look at the range of goods typically provided by governments, focusing in particular on the case of prisons. Their conclusion is that government ownership of prisons is appropriate. The main contribu-tion of the paper is methodological, showing how the incomplete contract approach can be used to think about the role of the government.
Another important paper is \The Quality of Government" [25] Like the vast body of growth regressions, the paper leaves one with mixed feelings, the feeling that quanti¯cation is essential, but also that the sheer number of potential explanatory variables, the poor measurement of many of these variables, and the simultaneity issues will always make it very di±cult to reach strong conclusions. The lesson from more than a decade of growth regressions is however that, while such regressions have rarely proven causality, they have allowed for a more informed discussion. The same is likely to happen here.
From Russia to America
What explains Andrei's amazing drive and enthusiasm for life? The empirical evidence suggests an explanation based both on both nature and 
